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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic Ocean is the smallest1 and least understood2 ocean in
the world, yet it contains more than one-quarter of the earth’s entire
continental shelf.3 In recent years, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “Convention”)4 has emerged as a
powerful driver for acquiring scientific data about the Arctic
continental shelf and seafloor and for encouraging new forms of
scientific and diplomatic cooperation in the wild, pristine and
diminishingly icy but still dangerous seascape of the Arctic Ocean.5
This cooperation is in stark contrast to media assertions of the
potential for conflict in the Arctic and to other speculation, often
focusing unduly on the Russian Federation, that an unregulated race
for the North Pole is underway.6 In fact, Russia was the first State,
1. See Michael Pidwirny, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY (2006),
http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/8o.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2009) (noting that the Arctic Ocean only covers about 3% of the Earth’s surface
area, whereas the Pacific Ocean, for example, covers about 31%); see also COMM.
ON THE ARCTIC RESEARCH VESSEL ET AL., ARCTIC OCEAN RESEARCH AND
SUPPORTING FACILITIES: NATIONAL NEEDS AND GOALS 7 (1995) (pointing out that,
in spite of its small areal size, the Arctic Ocean has the world’s widest continental
shelves, which extend up to 1,210 km from certain points off the Siberian
coastline).
2. See George B. Newton, A Message From the Chair in U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH COMM., REPORT ON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR ARCTIC RESEARCH
(2005), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_2005_goals.pdf
(remarking that there has been an increased research focus on the Arctic since the
end of the Cold War).
3. George B. Newton, Coming to the Arctic: Oil, Ships, and UNCLOS Plus
Risk and Research in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND THE LAW
OF THE SEA 321, 324 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005).
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 6, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. See generally Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., http://nsidc.org/arcticseaice
news/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (charting the rapid and unexpected decline in the
extent and thickness of Arctic Sea ice which, along with other natural drivers, has
increased access to the seafloor and resulted in an increase in the amount of
available data pertaining to the arctic region). On the challenges and dangers posed
by an ice-diminished Arctic Ocean, see generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC
MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT (2009).
6. See, e.g., Arctic Thaw Presents New Chance for Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/world/europe/29ihtarctic.1.19773378.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (describing a gathering of
NATO commanders and lawmakers in Reykjavik, Iceland to discuss concerns over
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Arctic or otherwise, to submit information under internationally
agreed procedures to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (“CLCS” or “Commission”), a review body of
scientists created under the Convention.7 This article demonstrates
how UNCLOS has provided Russia and its Arctic neighbors with a
legal framework for scientific and diplomatic cooperation that can
extend beyond mapping the Arctic continental shelf. It also
underlines the fundamental reliance of law on science in the
continental shelf mapping process, showing how recent mapping
efforts have contributed to the unprecedented availability of
information about the nature and history of the Arctic Ocean.8 In
new standoffs in the Arctic Circle); C.J. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians
Plant the Flag on the Arctic Seabed, Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2007, at A8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07
E2DB1630F930A3575BC0A9619C8B63 (speculating that securing the rights to
the resources of the Arctic seabed, around which Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia, and the United States have territory, could be the key to future national
wealth and power).
7. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II (stating that the States Parties elect
experts from the fields of geology, geophysics, or hydrography to serve on the
twenty-one-member Commission). See generally Ted L. McDorman, The Role of
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a
Political World, 17 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 301, 312 (2002) (noting that,
unlike international courts, the Commission is not an arbitrator of inter-state “lines
in the water” disputes, but rather serves an advisory function for States regarding
the application of Article 76); Betsy Baker, States Parties and the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in LAW OF THE SEA, PROTECTION OF THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE
THOMAS A. MENSAH 669, 680-86 (Tafsir Malik Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.,
2007) (discussing the absence of legal expertise on the Commission as a potential
source of questions as to the precise legal effect of its recommendations).
8. See LARRY A. MAYER & ANDREW A. ARMSTRONG, UNIV. OF N.H. CTR.
FOR COASTAL AND OCEAN MAPPING, JOINT HYDROGRAPHIC CTR. CRUISE REPORT:
USCGC ICEBREAKER HEALY (WAGB-20) U.S. LAW OF THE SEA CRUISE TO MAP
THE FOOT OF THE SLOPE AND 2500-M ISOBATH OF THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN
MARGIN 3 (2008) [hereinafter CCOM/JHC REPORT] (noting that the HEALY 08-05
voyage to map the seafloor on the Chukchi Cap not only helps identify where the
United States may extend its continental shelf under UNCLOS, but also generates
data for understanding processes, habitats, and climate models, which may, in turn,
lead to a fuller understanding of how the Arctic is changing); see also Deborah R.
Hutchinson et al., Acquiring Marine Data in the Canada Basin, Arctic Ocean, 90
EOS 197, 197-98 (2009) (stating that the UNCLOS gives coastal nations incentives
to work together to address the difficulties associated with collecting geophysical
data in the ice-covered Arctic); Larry Mayer et al., Challenges of Collecting Law
of the Sea Data in the Arctic in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA 125, 126 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005) (explaining
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doing so, it examines how lawyers and scientists approach the same
treaty provisions from their respective disciplinary perspectives. The
article concludes by considering how recent U.S. and Russian
statements of national policy regarding the Arctic, and how nurturing
joint scientific projects there, can strengthen science and
international cooperation in the region.
The five states with potential extended continental shelf above the
Arctic Circle9—Canada, Denmark on behalf of Greenland, Norway,
Russia, and the United States—are actively mapping the Arctic
Ocean continental shelf as part of delimiting their respective shelves
in accordance with Article 76 of the Convention.10 The sheer breadth
of the Arctic continental shelf is strikingly evident in the
International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (“IBCAO”).11
Itself a product of international scientific cooperation in preparation
for Article 76 mapping, the IBCAO renders with immediate clarity
the most arresting features of Arctic Ocean bathymetry, such as the
Lomonosov, Alpha-Mendeleev, and Gakkel Ridges.12
Under the Convention, a coastal State has exclusive sovereign
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of its continental
shelf.13 Within 200 nautical miles (“nm”) from its territorial sea
baseline, the State is automatically entitled to exercise these rights
without taking further action even if the physiographic shelf does not
that the UNCLOS requires States seeking an extended continental shelf to measure
“the absolute depth of the seafloor . . . the shape of the seafloor . . . the distance
from the territorial baseline, and the thickness of the sediment column” in order to
establish a claim).
9. See Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Geographical
Coverage, http://www.amap.no (follow “Geographical Coverage” hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 29, 2009) (defining the Arctic Circle as roughly north of 66 degrees,
32 minutes latitude, but recognizing that different entities may differ about the
exact demarcation of the region).
10. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1) (defining the continental shelf as
“the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal
State’s] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin”).
11. See infra Appendix, fig.1.
12. See infra Part VI, notes 121-131 (discussing IBCAO as a collaborative
effort to exchange data in preparation for Article 76 mapping).
13. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(1)-(2) (providing that no one may
explore or exploit the natural resources of a coastal State’s continental shelf
without the express consent of that coastal State, even if that coastal State is not
exercising its own right to do so).
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extend that far.14 Beyond 200 nm, a State may provide scientific
evidence to establish the extent of the legally defined continental
shelf in order to exercise the same rights.15 That extent is determined
in part by measuring the “natural prolongation” of a coastal State’s
land territory under water.16 The shelf beyond 200 nm is sometimes
referred to as the “extended continental shelf,”a term of convenience
that does not appear in the treaty.
Each State has ten years from the date the Convention entered into
force for that State to make a submission to the Commission.17 Of the
five Arctic coastal States, Russia18 and Norway19 have met their
deadlines and also received recommendations20 from the
Commission, while Canada and Denmark on behalf of Greenland
have until 2013 and 2014, respectively.21 As a non-party, the United
States will not face a deadline until it accedes to the Convention.22
14. See id. arts. 76(1), 76(4), 77.
15. Id. art. 76(4).
16. Id. art. 76(1).
17. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 4.
18. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by
the Russian Federation, Ref. No. CLCS 01.2001.LOS (Dec. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm
[hereinafter Russ. CLCS Submission].
19. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by
the Kingdom of Norway, Ref. No. CLCS.07.2006.LOS (Nov. 26, 2006), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm
[hereinafter Nor. CLCS Submission].
20. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Oceans
and the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 38-41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Sec’y Gen. Report]; Recommendations
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the
Submission Made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents
Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2009 (adopted Mar. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_
rec_summ.pdf.
21. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Law of the
Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI
~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en [hereinafter UNCLOS Ratifications]
(listing the dates on which the Convention entered into force as: June 24, 2006 for
Norway; March 12, 1997 for Russia; November 7, 2003 for Canada; and
November 16, 2004 for Denmark).
22. States not party to Convention may not make submissions to the CLCS. As

BAKER_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

256

2/15/2010 2:10 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:251

Nonetheless, the United States commissioned a 2002 study on the
potential for extending its shelf, prepared by the Center for Coastal
and Ocean Mapping/Joint Hydrographic Center at the University of
New Hampshire (“CCOM/JHC”),23 which has gathered over a
million square kilometers of bathymetric data since 2003.24
One significant reason states are interested in mapping the
continental shelf is that Article 77 of the Convention gives them
exclusive sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting” the living and non-living resources of their portion of the
shelf’s seabed and subsoil.25 Non-living resources include gas and
oil, gas hydrates and minerals, and living resources include bottom
dwelling “sedentary” species such as clams and chemo-synthetic
communities such as black smokers.26 The sovereign rights
articulated in Article 77 do not extend to resources in the water
of November 2009, the United States had not acceded to the treaty, which
President Bill Clinton first transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent on
October 7, 1994, together with the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation
of Part XI of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (signed July 29, 1994).
The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has recommended accession to
the treaty on three separate occasions. Despite widespread support by all branches
of the U.S. armed services, environmental, and industry groups, all three times a
vote of the full Senate has been blocked by a handful of Senators. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Mattler, The Law of the Sea Convention: A View from the U.S. Senate,
in INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, THE ARCTIC AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 33, 33
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2005).
23. LARRY A. MAYER ET AL., UNIV. OF N.H. CTR. FOR COASTAL AND OCEAN
MAPPING, JOINT HYDROGRAPHIC CTR., THE COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
RELEVANT TO A U.S. CLAIM UNDER UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA ARTICLE
76: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002), available at http://ccom.unh.edu/publications
/Mayer_02_Compilation_analysis_data_relevant_to_UNCLOS_76.pdf [hereinafter
CCOM/JHC Article 76 Report].
24. U.S. Dep’t. of State, U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/continentalshelf/index.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009)
(noting that Congress and National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration
(“NOAA”) have funded twelve JHC Arctic Ocean research cruises between 2003
and 2009, most recently in August-September 2009). The inter-agency U.S.
Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, chaired by the Department of State,
oversees the mapping process for all U.S. coastal areas. See U.S. Dep’t of State,
Ocean and Polar Affairs, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/ (last visited Nov.
29, 2009).
25. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(1) (emphasis added).
26. Id. art. 77(4) (defining “sedentary” organisms as those which are
“immobile on or under the seabed or unable to move except in constant physical
contact with the seabed or the subsoil” at the stage of harvest).
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column such as fish stocks, which are covered under a separate
regime for the Exclusive Economic Zone established under Part V of
the Convention.27 Nor do the continental shelf rights, which by the
terms of Article 77 are for the specific purpose of exploring and
exploiting resources, amount to full sovereignty or even to a greater
jurisdiction over the area such as is enjoyed in territorial waters.28
Under the maritime zones elaborated in UNCLOS, all States enjoy
certain navigational, research (with coastal State permission) and
other rights over and on the continental shelf of a coastal State,
which may, in some instances, be overlain by High Seas.29
A 2008 survey conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated
that up to a third of the world’s remaining and technically
recoverable hydrocarbon reserves may be located north of the Arctic
Circle.30 A 2009 analysis of that survey concluded that the majority
of such reserves are located offshore under less than 500 meters of
water.31 These observations suggest that many reserves likely occur
well within areas already clearly subject to respective national
jurisdictions, rendering the outcome of the extended continental shelf
mapping relatively unimportant when it comes to any “new”
hydrocarbon resources being allocated to any Arctic States as a result
of the Article 76 process. They also render inapposite many of the
arguments fueling misconceptions that a new “gold rush” or “cold
war” is imminent between the five northern circumpolar states.
27. Id. arts. 55-75 (setting forth the legal regime governing the “exclusive
economic zone,” which is the area adjacent to, and not more than 200 nm beyond
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured).
28. Compare id. art. 77(1)-(2) (giving coastal States exclusive rights over the
continental shelf, but limiting these rights to exploration and exploitation of natural
resources), with id. art. 2 (providing that the sovereignty of a coastal State over the
territorial sea extends to air space over the territorial sea and the seabed and
subsoil, limited only by the Convention and international law).
29. See, e.g., id. art. 90 (“Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the
right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.”).
30. See Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of the Undiscovered Oil and Gas
in the Arctic, 324 SCIENCE 1175, 1176 (2009) (specifying that U.S. Geological
Survey estimated that the arctic region contains 13% of the world’s undiscovered
oil resources and 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas resources). See
generally U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (Peter H. Stauffer ed.
2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf (providing
the raw data of the study in graphical form divided into various types of natural
resources).
31. Gautier et al., supra note 30, at 1175.
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I. THE IRRELEVANCE OF FLAGS AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF ACCESSION
In 2001, recognizing the legal certainty and legitimacy that the
CLCS process would bring to its rights over the extended continental
shelf, the Russian Federation became the first state32 to file a
submission with the Commission.33 The submission covered areas of
the continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean, as well as the
Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk.34 In 2002,
Russia also became the first state to receive a recommendation—a
formal evaluation of its submission—from the Commission.35 The
Commission requested “a number of points of clarification” as well
as more data from the Russian Federation.36 Since then, Russia has
been gathering additional data, working with its Arctic neighbors on
shelf issues37 and abiding by the Rules of Procedure38 and Scientific

32. U.N. Div. for Ocean Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Submissions Through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, Pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 8, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2009) [hereinafter CLCS Submissions]. Many States outside the Arctic
are also mapping under Article 76, which applies to any coastal State that is party
to the Convention. The Commission had received fifty-one submissions or
preliminary information from over forty States as of December 2009. Id. At the
Commission’s current rate of issuing some two recommendations per year in a
nine-week session, Macnab has estimated it would take until 2059 to process all
Submissions. Ron Macnab, Complications in Delimiting the Outer Continental
Shelf, Presentation at The 33rd Center for Oceans and Law Policy Conference:
Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea (May 20-22, 2009),
available at http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Macnab-outer-continental-shelf.pdf.
33. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18; see also Sec’y Gen. Report,
supra note 20, ¶ 27 (acknowledging receipt of the Russian Federation's submission
on December 20, 2001).
34. Sec’y Gen. Report, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 38-41.
35. CLCS Submissions, supra note 32.
36. Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18.
37. See generally Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics: The
Continental Shelf Extension, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 343 (2008) [hereinafter
Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics]; see also infra Part IV.
38. See U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Part VII,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 (Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter CLCS Rules of Procedure]
(illustrating procedure for Commission’s consideration of a submission).
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and Technical Guidelines39 established by the CLCS and the States
Parties to the Convention.
Despite persistent and often misleading media coverage to the
contrary,40 neither Russia nor any of the four other Arctic coastal
states are engaged in a “land grab” or fomenting “conflict in the
Arctic.” There has been a significant effort on the part of the Arctic
Ocean littoral states to follow the agreed rules of international law
and each state is carrying out the costly scientific research necessary
to provide legal certainty as to where it will delineate its respective
extended continental shelf in the Arctic.41 Gathering sufficient data
for an Article 76 submission is typically a multi-year, multi-ministry,
and multi-million dollar undertaking.42 Given the difficulties, dangers
39. U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Scientific and
Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/11 (May 13, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS Scientific and Technical
Guidelines].
40. See, e.g., MacKenzie Funk, Healy Mapping Mission: Arctic Landgrab,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, May 2009, at 104 (portraying the current exploration of the
Arctic as a competition between Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the
United States). Notwithstanding the misleading implications of the title of “Arctic
Landgrab,” this article does an excellent job of describing the Article 76 process
and detailing the work of Larry Mayer and the 2007 HEALY ECS mapping cruise
in the Arctic Ocean. The numerous maps accompanying the article give a visual
summary of many of the issues involved in mapping the Arctic Ocean, the
diminishing arctic sea ice, and the potential for hydrocarbon and other natural
resource exploitation in the region. Id. at 110-117.
41. See, e.g., Riddell-Dixon, Canada and Arctic Politics, supra note 37;
Russian Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Map Two Legend, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/
RUS_page5_Legend.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (referring to maps published
as part of the original Russian Submission to the CLCS “provisional” and “subject
to more precise determination through negotiations” with neighboring States); Nor.
CLCS Submission, supra note 19 (providing the full Submission to the
Commission of Norway).
42. A number of developing countries, including Somalia, faced a May 2009
deadline to submit a claim. Recognizing that many countries lack the financial and
technical resources necessary to prepare the claim, in July 2008 the General
Assembly approved a special process whereby States could file a statement of
preliminary information to satisfy the ten year submission deadline. See, e.g.,
Somalia Submits Continental Shelf Information with Norwegian Assistance,
NORWAY POST, http://www.norwaypost.no/content/view/21910/26/ (last visited
Dec. 1, 2009) (reporting that Somalia, with Norwegian aid, became the first
African country and the first developing country to make a preliminary submission
indicating the outer limits of its continental shelf and highlighting the challenges
developing coastal States face in making these submissions).
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and expense of collecting relevant data in the Arctic Ocean, many
states are exchanging data and, in some cases, engaging in joint
missions to gather information.43
In February 2007, the Russian polar explorer and member of the
Duma, Artur Chilingarov carried off the technically stunning feat of
using a two Mir manned mini-submersibles to plant a titanium
Russian Federation flag at a depth of some 4200 meters at the
geographic North Pole.44 The scientific community acknowledged
this logistical and technological accomplishment for advancing
funding of polar science generally, though with mixed views as to its
actual scientific import.45 Political and media voices responded more
hyperbolically, some asserting a new race for the Arctic,46 while
diplomatic and scholarly sources pointed out in more measured tones
that, at best, the event possessed mere symbolic value.47
Article 77 of UNCLOS makes clear that any potential act of
occupation such as flag planting has no legal significance with
respect to coastal States’ “sovereign rights” over their continental
shelves, which are exercised and exist independently of any
statement or physical gesture and as a matter of right. As stated in

43. See infra Part IV.
44. See Russia Plants Flag Under N. Pole, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm (noting that unless the explorers
navigated back to the exact spot of their descent, they risked being trapped
underneath the Arctic ice sheet); Arthur Chilingarov: Russia’s Arctic Explorer,
MOSCOW NEWS, July 17, 2008, http://www.mnweekly.ru/interview/20080717/
55338262.html (interview) (comparing Russia’s flag planting at the North Pole to
the United States’ placing its flag on the Moon after the 1969 landing).
45. See, e.g., Tom Parfitt, Profile: Artur Chilingarov, Russia’s Polar Hero, 324
SCIENCE 1382, 1384 (2009) (observing that one polar expert has said, “you can’t
determine anything with a single bucket of mud from the Pole”).
46. See Chivers, supra note 6 (noting Russia’s renewed energy to engage in the
“international competition” for extraction rights in the polar region).
47. See Evan Bloom, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Third Symposium on
the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations at
Annapolis, Maryland (June 11, 2009) (remarking that it is often overlooked that
Chilingarov planted the flag during an expedition to gather bathymetric data for
Submission to the CLCS); Richard A. Lovett, Russia Plants Underwater Flag,
Claims Arctic Seafloor, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://news.
nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/07/070802-russia-pole.html (quoting Viktor
Posyolov, deputy director of Russia’s Institute of World Ocean Geology and
Mineral Resources, saying that the planting of the Russian flag “means nothing”
from a legal standpoint).
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Article 77(3): “The rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation.”48
On what, then, do the rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf depend? Beyond 200 nm, under the Convention
they depend in part on solid scientific data and “interpretation of the
bathymetry, geology, and nature of the seafloor in a region.”49 States
use such data to establish “the outer edge of the continental margin,”
the appurtenance of areas mapped to the State’s land territory,50 and
the limits beyond which the continental shelf may not extend under
Article 76.51 A State Party to the Convention submits its data to the
Commission, which comprises twenty-one experts in geology,
geophysics, or hydrography.52 Commissioners are elected by the
States Parties with an eye to “equitable geographic representation,”
but the Commissioners must “serve in their personal capacities.”53 As
of December 2009, two of the five Arctic coastal States, Russia and
Norway, had members on the CLCS.54 Article 76 provides that if a
State uses the Commission recommendations as the basis of its
published continental shelf limits, those limits are “final and
binding.”
A state that is not party to the Convention need not submit data to
the Commission in order to establish the outer limits of its extended
continental shelf. However, the absence of the Commission’s
imprimatur is one basis for other states to call into question any
state’s assertion of extended continental shelf rights. The fact that

48. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(3).
49. See CCOM/JHC REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
50. See CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.1.2.
(stating that the test of appurtenance consists in demonstrating that the natural
prolongation of a coastal State’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin extends beyond a line delineated 200 nm from the baselines used to
measure the breadth of the territorial sea).
51. See infra Part II, notes 64-84 (discussing these technical concepts in
relation to the Article 76 mapping basics).
52. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 2.
53. Id. Annex II, art. 2(1).
54. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Members of the
Commission, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_
members.htm#Members (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (showing current membership,
elected in June 2007 for a term of five years).
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non-parties may not make a submission to the CLCS55 is emphasized
by proponents of U.S. accession to UNCLOS. Although the United
States is actively mapping in anticipation of joining the Convention,
it must also plan for the event of non-accession. Absent membership,
the United States could proceed to publish what it considers to be the
outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm and rely on the
less secure foundation of customary international law to support
those assertions.

II. HOW SCIENCE AND LAW APPROACH ARTICLE
76 MAPPING
The observation that scientists, policymakers, and lawyers—even
while working together—take different approaches to understanding
natural phenomena is not new, either generally56 or in the Polar
Regions.57 In some respects, the history of modern multilateral
environmental agreements58and certainly that of modern ocean
management59 could be written as the story of scientists, lawyers, and
55. ILA, Legal Issues of the Outer Continental Shelf, 72 INT’L L. ASS’N REP.
CONF. 215 (2006) [hereinafter ILA Second Report] (Conclusion 16: “the right to
make a submission to the CLCS, and the concomitant right to establish final and
binding outer limits on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, only
exist for States Parties to the Convention”); see also ILA, Legal Issues of the Outer
Continental Shelf, 71 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 2773 (2006) [hereinafter ILA
First Report] (same).
56. For example, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf also
gave rise to different physical and legal understandings of the continental shelf.
See Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311; G. Etzel Pearcy, The Continental Shelf: Physical vs. Legal
Definition, 3 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 26 (1961) (comments by the Office of the
Geographer, U.S. Department of State).
57. Cf. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND STEWARDSHIP IN THE ANTARCTIC 2
(1993) (recommending improvements in scientific monitoring programs to bring
them more in line with the Antarctic Treaty’s Protocol on Environmental
Protection).
58. See, e.g., KATE O’NEILL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 63-66, passim (2009) (providing an extensive bibliography of
literature relevant to the interactions between law, science, and policy in shaping
international approaches to addressing environmental concerns); Volker Röben,
Institutional Developments Under Modern International Environmental
Agreements, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 363, 394 (2000) (“In order to assist
States Parties to make complex trade-offs between scientific uncertainties and
political judgments, many international environmental agreements have established
a subsidiary body on scientific, technological and technical advice.”).
59. YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, A DUAL APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE
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policymakers attempting to describe and regulate an environmental
concern, translating their disciplines for one another with varying
degrees of success. Changes in technology and scientific
understanding of the natural phenomena a treaty attempts to regulate
will necessarily impact how effectively the Convention can be
implemented. In the case of Article 76 mapping, much has been
learned about the relationship between the ocean floor and the
continental shelf since UNCLOS was opened for signature in 1982,60
in part because of the advances in the technology used to map the
world’s oceans.61 By necessity, lawyers, scientists, and policymakers
involved in Article 76 mapping educate each other about how these
changes affect implementation of the Convention,62 and about how
their respective disciplines approach the Convention and its
requirements.63
CASES OF ZONAL AND INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 209 (2008) (“It is no exaggeration to say that marine scientific research is a
foundation of ocean governance.”).
60. See, e.g., Bernard Coakley & Betsy Baker, Mapping for Advocacy - Using
Marine Geophysical Data to Establish the Limits of Extend Continent Shelves
Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 89 EOS TRANS. AGU Fall Meeting
Supp., Abstract GC33B-0780 (2008) (stating that, since the signing of the
Convention in 1982, the “distinction between continental and ocean crust has been
blurred by a complex array of hybrids that complicate this determination (eg. [sic]
oceanic plateaus, hyper-extended continental crust, etc.)” requiring the mapping
process to “somehow reconcile the great diversity of seafloor structure and
composition that has been recognized with the simplistic language of the treaty
itself”).
61. See id. (“Article 76 was written at a time when narrow-beam bottom
sounder data was the primary bathymetric mapping tool. As a result it was built on
a remarkably simplistic view of the seafloor that has been completely overturned
by the swath bathymetric data collected over the last two decades.”).
62. See generally McDorman, supra note 7 (discussing the role of the
Commission as a scientific body in what is essentially a political process). There is
a burgeoning number of fora in which lawyers and scientists come together to
discuss Article 76. In 2009 alone, representative gatherings in the United States
included: “Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea,” the 33rd
annual conference of The Center for Oceans Law and Policy (“COLP”) of the
University of Virginia School of Law, May 20-22, 2009, in Seward, Alaska; the
Third Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and
Maritime Operations, June 9-11, 2009, at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis,
MD; and “Mounting Tensions and Melting Ice: Exploring the Legal and Political
Future of the Arctic” hosted by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,
February 6, 2009, in Nashville, TN.
63. See generally Chris M. Carleton et al., The Practical Realization of the
Continental Shelf Limit, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS 268 (Peter J. Cook &
Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000) (detailing the scientific techniques available to
delineate the outer limits of the continental shelf under Article 76).
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At a very basic level, States mapping the continental shelf beyond
200 nm are attempting to show how far out their land mass extends
underwater, by locating what the Convention calls “the outer edge of
the continental margin.”64 To do so, a State must first demonstrate
that the areas mapped are appurtenant to the State’s continental land
mass.65 If it satisfies this test of appurtenance,66 the State may then
locate the edge of the continental margin.67 It does this by finding the
“foot of the continental slope,” which involves drawing lines
between fixed points that are located a certain distance beyond the
slope under one of two formulae set out in Article 76.68 Next, the
State must apply constraint lines to the areas so mapped, so that its
continental shelf beyond 200 nm does not extend indefinitely.69 If the
coastal State meets these three steps, it may then delimit its
continental shelf beyond 200 nm.70
These Convention terms of art—”outer edge of the continental
margin” and “foot of the continental slope,” as well as “submarine
ridges” and “submarine elevations”—are juridical constructs used by
those who drafted the treaty to give legal designations to the natural
features of the continental shelf and ocean floor.71 These legal terms
64. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1), (4)(a).
65. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, TRAINING MANUAL
FOR DELINEATION OF THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200
NAUTICAL MILES AND FOR PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON
THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, at I-26, U.N. Sales No. E.06.v4 (2006)
[hereinafter TRAINING MANUAL].
66. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.2.2.
(defining “test of appurtenance” as the process for examining how a coastal State
establishes the outer edge of the continental margin to determine its legal
entitlement to the extended continental shelf under art. 76(4)).
67. Id.
68. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(4)(i)-(ii). To create both formulae lines, the
fixed points located in this manner are connected in 60 nm intervals. Id. The first
prong of Article 76(4) describes the so-called Gardiner formula, which results in
points being located where the sediment thickness is 1% of the distance back to the
foot of the slope. Id. art. 76(4)(a)(i). The simpler Hedberg formula found in the
second prong of Article 76 locates points 60 nm from the foot of the slope. States
may combine the points resulting from these two lines to their advantage. Id. art.
76(4)(a)(ii).
69. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-26.
70. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.2.3.
71. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-13, I-14 (noting that
UNCLOS’s legal designations grew out of State practice and represent a balance
between States’ divergent interests in simultaneously affirming their rights to areas
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do not always comport with how scientists understand those natural
features.72 For example, under Article 76, the continental margin
“comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the
coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the
slope and the rise.”73 The Convention subsumes those three
elements—the shelf, slope, and rise—into one legally defined term:
the continental shelf.74 Scientists, on the other hand, have
traditionally separated the three elements and considered the
continental shelf to be just one component of the margin.75 Figure 2
in the Appendix depicts these different physiographic and legal
approaches to the continental shelf.76
Locating the “foot of the continental slope” helps to delineate the
outer limits of a coastal State’s extended continental shelf.77
Geologists, geophysicists, and hydrographers who map the ocean and
interpret data gathered on mapping expeditions work to provide the
bright lines and individual points that the Convention encompasses
with the legal term “foot of the continental slope.”78 To assist them,

beyond the territorial sea based on the adjacency of the continental shelf to their
land territory and preventing interference with traditional governance of the high
seas).
72. See, e.g., id., at I-10 (stating that although the legal regime draws on
scientific concepts, it adopts more expansive definitions in order to accommodate
the interests of States with continental shelves of varying sizes).
73. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(3).
74. Id., art. 76(1) (identifying the continental shelf as a unified “natural
prolongation” of land territory).
75. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 65, at I-11 (explaining that the
scientific definition of “continental shelf” encompasses the “relatively flat and
shallow . . . submerged part of the continent,” which extends to the continental
slope).
76. See infra Appendix, fig.2; see also, e.g., SUZETTE V. SUAREZ, THE OUTER
LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEIR ESTABLISHMENT
239-252 (2008) (discussing differences in the legal and scientific understandings of
the continental shelf).
77. In paragraph 5.1.1., the CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines provide:
“The Commission recognizes that the foot of the continental slope is an essential
feature that serves as the basis for entitlement to the extended continental shelf and
the delineation of its outer limits.” CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines,
supra note 39, para. 5.1.1.
78. See Carleton et al., supra note 63, at 271 (“Clearly, there is no ‘exact’ foot
of the slope; there is, rather, a zone in which judgment must be applied to
determine the most likely location of the feature which is taken to mark the edge of
the continent.”).
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the CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines (“Guidelines”) aim to
clarify the Commission’s interpretations of the Convention’s
“scientific, technical and legal terms.”79 For example, Article 76(4)
of the Convention provides: “In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the
point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.”80 The
Guidelines elaborate, stating that the “identification of the region
defined as the base of the continental slope” is one of “the
fundamental requirements posed” by Article 76(4), locating the point
of maximum change in gradient at the base is the other.81
“Natural prolongation” and the “test of appurtenance” are two
more legal terms contained in or arising from the Convention that
scientists had not typically applied to the shelves and seafloors of the
world’s oceans. Article 76(1) defines the continental shelf of a
coastal State as comprising “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin.”82 The Guidelines note that Article 76(4)(a)
suggests the formulation of a test of appurtenance in order to entitle a
coastal State to extend the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond the
limit set by the 200-nautical-mile distance criterion. This test consists in
the demonstration of the fact that the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin extends beyond a line
delineated at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.83

The relationship of the natural prolongation to the test of
appurteancne to each other and to the Russian submission to the
Commission is explored below.

79. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 1.3.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(4)(b).
81. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, at para. 5.1.3.
(emphasis added).
82. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art.76(1) (emphasis added).
83. CLCS Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 39, para. 2.1.2.
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III. THE 2001 RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SUBMISSION TO THE CLCS
When combined with data being gathered as part of the Article 76
process, the test of appurtenance is especially relevant in the Arctic
Ocean, where the Russian Federation, Denmark, and Canada are
each attempting to show that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural
prolongation of its respective land mass.84 The Lomonosov Ridge
effectively bisects the Arctic Ocean, separating the Amerasian Basin
from the Eurasian Basin.85 The Russian Federation, in its submission
to the CLCS in 2001, asserted some degree of appurtenance of the
Lomonosov Ridge to its continental land mass.86 If the Lomonosov
Ridge is deemed appurtenant, the question still remains as to whether
it is a submarine ridge subject to the 350 nm cutoff discussed above
in Part II or whether, as would favor Russia, it is a submarine
elevation.87
As is the case with most submissions, at the time of Russia’s 2001
submission relatively few details were known about it because the
Article 76 process is largely confidential. All meetings are held in
private unless the Commission decides otherwise.88 As to the States’
submissions, the Rules of Procedure require that the Commission
make public only the Executive Summary that States are required to
84. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf , Statement
Made by the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources of the Russian Federation
During Presentation of the Submission Made by the Russian Federation to the
Commission, Made on 28 March 2002, U.N. Doc. CLCS/31, at 4-6 (Apr. 5, 2002)
(stressing that the categorization of the Lomonosov Ridge is “of fundamental
importance” to Russia’s submission to the CLCS); Nele Matz-Lück, Planting the
Flag in Arctic Waters: Russia’s Claim to the North Pole, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L L.
235, 250 (2009) (emphasizing correctly that there is “no broad consensus in the
Arctic geoscientific community whether or not elevations such as the Lomonosov
Ridge are natural prolongations”).
85. See infra Appendix, fig.1.
86. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18, Map 2.
87. On the Russian submission generally, see Ron Macnab & Lindsay Parson,
Continental Shelf Submissions: The Record to Date, 21 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 309 (2006). See also Matz-Lück, supra note 84, at 250 (“Russia
emphasizes the qualification of the Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge as
‘submarine elevations’ and not as ‘submarine ridges.’”).
88. See CLCS Rules of Procedure, supra note 38, R. 23 (private meetings); id.
Annex II, para. 4.2. (allowing a State to classify “any data and other material[] not
otherwise publicly available that it submits in accordance with” the CLCS Rules of
Procedure and Commission proceedings as private and confidential).
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provide, including relevant charts and coordinates.89 With respect to
the Commission’s own recommendations, it must make public a
summary, which “shall not contain information which might be of a
confidential nature and/or which might violate the proprietary rights
of the coastal State” to data and information submitted; further the
recommendation summary need contain only minimal references to
those parts of the Commission recommendations “related to” the
limits eventually deposited by the State under Article 76(9).90 Critics
have suggested that this lack of transparency diminishes the
credibility of the Article 76 process.91
In its recommendation responding to Russia’s 2001 submission,
the Commission requested more data with respect to the Central
Arctic Ocean, and recommended that Russia revise its submission
accordingly for later consideration.92 In addition, five states—
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and the United States—filed
responses to the Secretary General’s published executive summary of
the Russian submission.93 The U.S. Notification rejected out of hand
any possibility that the Lomonosov Ridge could be a natural
prolongation, even though the ridge will not be of any direct
significance to any possible U.S. submission. The U.S. Notification
stated summarily that “[t]he ridge is a freestanding feature in the
deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean basin, and not a natural
component of the continental margins of either Russia or any other

89. Id. R. 50.
90. CLCS Rules of Procedure, supra note 38, Annex III, Part V, para. 11(3); id.
R. 54.
91. See Ron Macnab, The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the
Outer Continental Shelf in Accordance with UNCLOS Article 76, 35 OCEAN DEV.
& INT’L L. 1, 11, 14-16 (2004) (recommending the use of procedures that
encourage States to make public even more information as part of their
submissions to the CLCS in order to quell skepticism of the submission process).
92. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, U.S. Reaction to Russian Continental Shelf Claim, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 969, 970 (2002). As of November 2009, Russia had not yet filed the
revised Submission.
93. See Russ. CLCS Submission, supra note 18; see also Matz-Lück, supra
note 84, at 249 (detailing further other states’ responses, none of which addressed
the substance of Russia’s submission to the extent the U.S. response did).
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State.”94 It also questioned Russian assertions with respect to the
nature of the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge.95
Developments since publication of the Russian submission, the
CLCS recommendation, and the U.S. response indicate how Article
76 mapping is making possible new understandings of the Arctic
Ocean continental shelf, and how policymakers rely fundamentally
on science in the Article 76 process, whether making submissions or
responding to them. Notwithstanding the U.S. Notification in 2002,
Russia has continued to gather data in the Central Arctic Ocean,
presumably some of which it hopes will support its position that the
Lomonosov Ridge is a natural prolongation of Russian land territory.
Canada and Denmark have since carried out joint seismic surveys in
the area to try to establish appurtenance between the Lomonosov
Ridge and Canada and Greenland, respectively.96 Russia and Canada
are exchanging data on related issues.97 In 2003, Russia organized an
international conference on the question of ridges, again driving
scientific exchange98 and, at a 2007 meeting, shared charts, maps,
and data from its 2001 submission with scientists from Canada and
Denmark, thereby giving them access to information that was
otherwise confidential under the processes outlined above.99 While
the United States has not offered any official comments amending its
94. United States of America: Notification Regarding the Submission Made by
the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
U.N. Ref. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.
Notification]; see also U.S ARCTIC RES. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR
2002, at 12 (2002), available at http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_2002_
annual.pdf (“Art Grantz and [Gary] Brass [then Executive Director, U.S. Arctic
Research Commission] felt some of the Russian claim was not justified by the
science and this was conveyed to the State Department.”).
95. U.S. Notification, supra note 94, at 3.
96. Nat. Resources Can., Using Science to Delineate the Limits of Canada’s
Continental Shelf, at 2, available at http://cgc.rncan.gc.ca/org/atlantic/pdf/unclos
_e.pdf.
97. Russia, Canada Agree to Share Information on Continental Shelf
Demarcation, RUSSIA & CIS BUSINESS & FINANCIAL NEWSWIRE (Mar. 30, 2007).
98. Macnab & Parson, supra note 87, at 311-312.
99. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extention:
Debunking Myths, POLICY OPTIONS, Sept. 2008, at 39, 42 [hereinafter RiddellDixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extension] (“This sharing gave
Canadian and Danish officials access to the details and analysis that would not
otherwise be available to them, as the specifics of submissions to the commission
are confidential.”).
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stance in the 2002 Notification, State Department representatives
have commented that the U.S. view of Arctic geology is evolving
and that, in hindsight, the Notification reflected an inadequate
appreciation of the scientific complexities involved.100
New information regarding the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge that is
emerging from Article 76 mapping work offers a window into how
theories about the Arctic Ocean shelf are competing and developing,
requiring policy makers to evaluate and translate these changes into
decisions about national submissions to the Commission. For
example, one observation in the 2002 U.S. Notification to the
Russian submission regarding the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge was to
question the composition of informally reported Russian samples
(“pebble and cobble suites”) in the region. The U.S. concluded that
the suites “can be shown to have originated in northwestern Canada,
and to have been distributed widely in the Amerasian Basin . . . by
glacial icebergs. They, therefore, cannot represent local bedrock on
Mendeleev Ridge” and, by implication, could not be considered to be
continental crust.101 Since that time, initial results from dredges
elsewhere on the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge system, which must still
undergo further analysis, suggest that current understanding of this
feature may need re-evaluation and have called into question
previous interpretations of the origins of that ridge system.
Considering the results of more detailed analyses of these and
other samples with the outcomes of studies such as those cited in the
2002 U.S. Notification will make for the most scientifically sound
U.S. delimitation of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean,
regardless of whether it does so as a State Party to the Convention or
independently thereof. Having the most complete picture of its own
continental shelf will also allow the United States to better evaluate
whatever information is eventually made public about Russia’s
subsequent submission to the Commission with respect to the Central
Arctic Ocean. Additionally, the transparency with which

100. See, e.g., Margaret Hayes, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Ocean and Polar
Affairs, Remarks at the American University International Law Review
Symposium: Russia and the Rule of Law, Arctic Panel (Feb. 11, 2009), video
available at http://media.wcl.american.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=70877630e145-4946-bf19-04b88b69d010.
101. U.S. Notification, supra note 94, at 3.
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CCOM/JHC is making its mapping data available102 may serve as an
impetus for other States to reconsider their more confidential policies
with respect to their Article 76 data. Arguably, the more States know
about each other’s potential submissions, the more confidence they
will place in the Article 76 mapping process.103 This transparency
with respect to scientific data could in turn bolster confidence in
policy and other statements from the Russian Federation that its
interests are best served by following the Convention’s processes for
delimiting the continental shelf, as explored in Part IV.

IV. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN ARCTIC
POLICY
On September 17, 2008, the Russian Security Council issued a
Maritime Strategy document that focused on the central importance
of the Arctic to its national security.104 On January 9, 2009, in the last
days of his administration, then-U.S. President George W. Bush
signed a dual Presidential Directive with the subtitle, “Arctic Region
Policy” (“2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy”).105 These Russian and
U.S. documents, and other statements from Russian government
sources have at least one message in common: that delimitation of
the Arctic continental shelf under international law is desirable for
legal certainty and strengthening national security.
102. See CCOM/JHC REPORT, supra note 8 (publishing extensive seafloor
mapping data due to its usefulness for Convention purposes and to promote better
understanding of conditions in the Arctic).
103. See Macnab, supra note 91, at 11, 14-16 (arguing that transparency breeds
credibility, as well as allows States to learn from each other about the best ways to
make submissions to the Commission).
104. See Statement of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Sept. 18,
2008), available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html (Russian-language
source) (proclaiming Russia’s national interests in the region as: a strategic
resource to tackle socio-economic development, to preserve the region as a zone of
peace and cooperation, to conserve the region’s unique ecosystem, and for use as a
northern sea route).
105. See National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security
Presidential Directiive 25 on Arctic Region Policy, Office of the Press Sec’y (Jan.
12, 2009) [hereinafter NSPD 66/HSPD 25] (stating the United States’ policy
objectives in the arctic region as: meeting national security needs; protecting the
Arctic environment; ensuring “natural resource management and economic
development;” strengthening cooperation between the eight Arctic nations;
involving the indigenous communities in decisions; and enhancing scientific
monitoring and research).
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The 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy supersedes an Arctic Policy
that had been in place since 1994. The earlier Directive,106 which
otherwise remains in place with respect to Antarctic Policy, set forth
U.S. policy with respect to both the Northern and Southern Polar
Regions.107 The 2009 Arctic Region Policy, under the paired rubrics
of National Security and Homeland Security, refers generally in its
second paragraph to the law of the sea108 and directly to UNCLOS in
three places: calling for U.S. accession,109 acknowledging the
fisheries regime established under the Convention and related
agreements,110 and recognizing the Convention as the “most effective
way to achieve international recognition and legal certainty for our
extended continental shelf.”111
A closer reading of the 2009 U.S. Arctic Region Policy underlines
the fact that science and law, working together, are essential
foundations to effective, considered, and visible U.S. participation in
the Arctic. The document opens by invoking the legal bases for its
implementation112 and contains references to UNCLOS and
international obligations throughout.113 Under “Extended Continental
Shelf and Boundary Issues,” Part III.D.3. refers to the existing
maritime treaty between Russia and the United States,114 as well as
other legal bases for resolving such issues.
On the scientific side, Part III.E. dedicates five paragraphs to
“Promoting International Scientific Cooperation,” and contains

106. Presidential Decision Directive 26, Antarctic: Funding of the United States
Antarctic Program, Including South Pole Station (Mar. 9, 1996).
107. NSPD 66/HSPD 25, supra note 105, pt. I.A.
108. Id. pt. I.B (“This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, with the obligations of the
United States under the treaties and other international agreements to which the
United States is a party, and with customary international law as recognized by the
United States, including with respect to the law of the sea.”).
109. Id. pt. III.C.4, C.5.d.
110. Id. pt. III.H.4.
111. Id. pt. III.D.I.
112. Id. pt. I.B.
113. Id. pt. III.C.
114. See id. pt. III.D.3 (“The United States and Russia are abiding by the terms
of a maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, pending its entry into force. The
United States is prepared to enter the agreement into force once ratified by the
Russian Federation.”).
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multiple references to international and multinational cooperation.115
These five paragraphs elaborate on the basic premise that scientific
research “is vital for the promotion of the United States interests in
the Arctic region” and specifically names the Russian Federation in
calling for greater access for researchers to all parts of the Arctic
Ocean: “Better coordination with the Russian Federation, facilitating
access to its domain, is particularly important.”116 2009 U.S. Arctic
Region Policy also promotes the “active involvement of all Arctic
nations . . . in order to advance scientific understanding that could
provide the basis for assessing future impacts and proposed response
strategies” with respect to environmental and climate change.117
The Russian Federation’s latest formal policy document with
respect to the Arctic was made public after the 2009 U.S. policy but
predated it by several months. In March 2009, the Russian Security
Council released a document118 entitled, “The Fundamentals of State
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to
2020 and Beyond” (Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi
Federatsii v Artike na period do 2020 goda i dalneishuiu
perspektivu), which president Dmitry Medvedev had signed on
September 18, 2008.119 That same month, the Russian Security
Council had convened meetings relevant to the Arctic120 and
President Medvedev also visited the Chukotka Autonomous Area,
calling it a “vital link of the Northern Sea Route.”121 In part as a
115. Id. pt. III.E.
116. Id. pt. III.E. (“Successful conduct of U.S. research in the Arctic region
requires access throughout the Arctic Ocean and to terrestrial sites, as well as
viable international mechanisms for sharing access to research platforms and
timely exchange of samples, data, and analyses.").
117. Id. pt. III.E.3.
118. See Dmitry Solovyov, Russia to Boost Arctic Troops to Defend Resources,
REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environment
News/idUSTRE52P5NS20090327 (reporting on the Russian Security Council’s
release of a paper outlining its Arctic policy until 2020, which includes the creation
of new troop formation to secure Russia’s Arctic borders).
119. See Katarzyna Zysk, Comment, Russian: Arctic Strategy, September 2008,
Geopolitics in the North: Arctic Strategy Documents, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.
org/index.php?option=com_content&iew=article&id=84:arctic-strategy-documents
&catid=1:latest-news (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (describing the strategy's
emphasis on the importance of the Arctic to Russia's wealth and development).
120. Solovyov, supra note 119.
121. Medvedev Calls for Developing Chukotka Infrastructure, PRIME-TASS, Sep.
23, 2008, available at http://www.prime-tass.com/news/print.asp?id=444768&
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response to concerns that these and other actions foretold increased
Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Russian Foreign Ministry
asserted with respect to the region, that “Russia strictly abides by the
norms and principles of international law and is firmly determined to
act within existing international agreements and mechanisms.”122
President Medvedev noted further that Russia should “wrap up all
the formalities for drawing the external border in the continental
shelf” in the Arctic.123 These responses, and indeed the policies
themselves, can be seen as an invocation of the rule of law, not an
assertion of undue regional influence, to reach a state of legal
certainty for both the Russian Federation and all others interested in
establishing clear delimitations in the Arctic Ocean.124

CONCLUSION: SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION
The requirements in Article 76 of UNCLOS for delimiting the
continental shelf have led the Russian Federation, the United States,
and their Arctic neighbors to rely on common scientific processes
and agreed rules of international law in preparing to establish the
outer limits of their continental shelves. International teams of
topicid=0; see also Caitlyn Antrim, Russia and the Changing Geopolitics of the
Arctic, WORLD POL. REV., May/June 2009, at 8, available at http://www.world
politicsreview-digital.com/wpr/20090506/?pg=10 (describing the geopolitical
aspects of the Northern Sea Route).
122. Russia Denies Plans to Carry Out “Unilateral Partition” of Oil-Rich
Arctic, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=67031; see also Russia Strictly
Follows Regulatory Framework for Arctic Ocean, ITAR-TASS, Sept. 23, 2008
(explaining that the President is preparing a federal law on the southern border of
the Russian Arctic zone that includes determining which Russian Federation
entities touch the border and how to plan for the socio-economic development
expected in those entities).
123. Russia Denies Plans to Carry Out “Unilateral Partition” of Oil-Rich
Arctic, supra note 123; see also Katarzyna Zysk, Geopolitics in the Arctic: The
Russian Security Perspective, in CLIMATE OF OPINION: THE STOCKHOLM
NETWORK'S ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT UPDATE, ISSUE 12 - THE ARCTIC : MARCH
2009, Mar. 2009, at 7, 8 (stating that Russia "has acted in compliance with
international law in pursuing its territorial claims”).
124. Zysk, supra note 120 (remarking that Russia lists “[d]efining the limits of
[its] continental shelf by 2015 . . . as a top priority”); see also Antrim, supra note
122 (pointing out that UNCLOS and its jurisdictional dispute rules have been
around for over twenty-five years and that “the [C]onvention ensures that, despite
alarmist forecasts, Arctic disputes, when they arise, are likely to be matters of law
and diplomacy rather than conflict and stalemate”).
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scientists have worked together on gathering mapping data or
exchanging information in the Arctic.125 Arctic Ocean littoral states
have used the peaceful processes of diplomatic notifications for
questioning or responding to the first Russian Federation submission
to the CLCS. Combined with the recently articulated Russian
Federation and United States policies regarding the Arctic Region,
these developments suggest that prospects for increased scientific
collaboration between the two countries could be improving.
Mutually beneficial joint research could overcome territorial,
political, and security concerns that may be preventing Russian
scientists from participating in a broader range of collaborative
projects.126
The IBCAO map referenced at the outset of this article and
reproduced in Figure 1 in the Appendix, is one example of successful
circumpolar scientific cooperation driven by the Convention. In the
early stages of preparing for Article 76 mapping, scientists
collaborated to produce the IBCAO127 by consolidating data from
various national databases. IBCAO produced its first chart in just
three years, from 1997 to 2000, and issued version 2.0 in 2008.
Writing in 2001, IBCAO participants explained:
[I]nvestigators from the five coastal States have met regularly since 1996
to discuss the coordination of scientific and technical procedures involved
in the implementation of Article 76, and to develop a common
understanding of the factors peculiar to the Arctic Ocean that impact upon
those procedures, e.g. the identification and classification of natural
prolongations, the criteria for locating the foot of the slope and the
Gardiner line, etc. To the limit of practicability, the investigators have
also agreed to construct common models of bathymetry and sediment

125. See Riddell-Dixon, Canada’s Arctic Continental Shelf Extension, supra
note 99, at 40-42.
126. That such concerns are preventing full Russian participation in circumpolar
research efforts has been expressed in various fora, including “Changes in the
Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea,” the 33rd annual conference of The
Center for Oceans Law and Policy (“COLP”), May 20-22, 2009, in Seward,
Alaska, and the Third Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on
Naval and Maritime Operations, June 9-11, 2009, at the Naval Academy in
Annapolis, MD.
127. Ron Macnab et al., Cooperative Preparations for Determining the Outer
Limit of the Juridicial Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: A Model for Regional
Collaboration in Other Parts of the World?, IBRU BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL.,
Spring 2001, at 86, 87; infra Appendix, fig.1.
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thickness, so that inconsistencies between their respective results are
caused by varying methods of interpretation, and not by incompatibilities
between data holdings.128

The
International
Arctic
Science
Committee,
the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and the International
Hydrographic Office all endorsed the IBCAO project.129 The “limit
of practicability” to the “common models” referenced above have
not prevented further collaboration between scientists involved in
mapping the Arctic Ocean, suggesting that similar approaches might
be followed in other research areas.130 As previously noted, Russian
and Canadian scientists are exchanging information relevant to
determining whether the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural prolongation
of the continental landmass, and Canadian and Danish researchers
are pursuing joint seismic operations to explore the same question.131
The United States and Canada have carried out joint mapping cruises
in the Arctic Ocean since 2008 and have plans to continue such
collaboration.132 Whether these activities will lead to joint
submissions by one or more Arctic states remains to be seen.
Beyond continental shelf mapping and the requirements of Article
76 of UNCLOS, basic arctic geosciences could provide a useful
realm of cooperative endeavor. One ongoing cooperative project
between United States and Russian scientists involves geologic
history and plate tectonic reconstruction research in the Russian Far
East.133 Workshops such as those held to identify common research
interests in the region could serve as blueprints for collaborative
work in other fields. Another simple model to improve international
128. Id. at 90.
129. Id.
130. Id. (commenting on upcoming projects involving aeromagnetic data).
131. Nat. Resources Can., supra note 96.
132. See U.S. Dep’t. of State, U.S.-Canada Joint Expedition to Survey the
Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic (July 28, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126588.htm (observing that, in addition
to advancing the mapping efforts of both countries, the joint expedition “saves
millions of dollars”).
133. See Joint U.S.-Russia Workshop on the Plate Tectonic Evolution of
Northeast Russia (Dec. 9-12, 2004), http://pangea.stanford.edu/research/structure/
nerussia/index.html (stating that the primary goal of the workshop, which brought
together key Russian and American research scientists, was to “to frame a longterm scientific plan and to outline potential collaborative projects that utilize
existing expertise, databases, laboratories and institutional capabilities”).
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scientific cooperation is to alternate the venues for important
conferences so that each country can host such gatherings.134
Given the number of joint efforts by Arctic states to gather data
relevant to mapping the continental shelf outlined above, it is
important to recall that Article 76 itself contains no specific reference
to scientific cooperation. UNCLOS as a whole, however, is replete
with references to cooperation.135 This is not the place to discuss at
length the importance of cooperation to the Convention’s regime for
Marine Scientific Research (Part XIII),136 but rather to point to
Article 242’s requirement that states and competent international
organizations “shall . . . promote international cooperation in marine
scientific research for peaceful purposes.” This requirement is not
only to enable such research but to “integrate the efforts of scientists
in studying the essence of phenomena and processes occurring in the
Marine environment and the interrelations between them.”137

134. For example, the 2009-2010 Sixth International Conference on Arctic
Margins (“ICAM”) will be in Fairbanks, Alaska. Holding the 2013-1014 Seventh
ICAM in St. Petersburg would allow Russian scientists to showcase their related
work. Previous ICAMs have been held in Canada, Germany, Russia, and the
United States. “The [ICAM] was founded by the U.S. Department of the Interior
Minerals Management Service in 1991 with the underlying two-point theme of
Arctic understanding and international cooperation in Arctic research. To these
ends, ICAM has provided a forum for the exchange of information and
presentation of research.” International Conference on Arctic Margins,
http://www.mms.gov/Alaska/icam/background.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
135. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 4, pmbl.; id. arts. 194, 197, 200, 204, 206
and 234 (mentioning joint measures or cooperation).
136. See, e.g., FLORIAN H.TH. WEGELEIN, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: THE
OPERATION AND STATUS OF RESEARCH VESSELS AND OTHER PLATFORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (providing detailed studies of the Convention’s
Marine Scientific Research regime); MONTSERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AN
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2003) (same); see
also J. Ashley Roach, Marine Scientific Research and the New Law of the Sea, 27
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 59 (1996). For a more recent listing of resources on
Marine Scientific Resarch, see TANAKA, supra note 59, at 209 n.1.
137. See TANAKA, supra note 59, at 213 (“Article 244 (2) also ensures that
States, both individually and in co-operation with other States and with competent
international organisations, shall actively promote the flow of scientific data and
the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine scientific research, especially to
developing States.”).
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As the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004138 and the Fourth
International Polar Year (“IPY”) 2007-2009139 made abundantly
clear, continuing and expanding scientific investigation of the
unprecedented changes now occurring in the arctic environment is
key to understanding the relationship of those changes - both in
cause and effect - to global change. The Sustaining Arctic Observing
Networks (“SAON”), endorsed by the Arctic Council, the
International Arctic Science Committee, the World Meteorological
Organisation and supported by a much larger initiating group, is just
one project growing out of the Fourth IPY designed to help achieve
this end.140 Given that the Russian continental shelf is by far the
largest in the Arctic Ocean, the absence of participation by Russian
Federation scientists and limited or no access to that shelf would
mean significant gaps in data and understanding, weakening the
usefulness of SAON and, indeed, any scientific undertaking hoping
to include truly circumpolar data.
Long before the start of the UNCLOS III negotiations that led to
the 1982 Convention, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(“USSR”) was a vocal member of the international scientific
community as it expressed collective concern about growing
restrictions worldwide on access to continental shelves for research
purposes.141 Indeed, as early as “January 1967 after earlier discussion
in the [Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (“IOC”)], the
138. ACIA SECRETARIAT, ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACTS
ASSESSMENT (2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html.
The ACIA was a project of the International Arctic Science Committee and the
Arctic Council.
139. The Fourth International Polar Year (“IPY”), 2007–09 generated
significant research into the causes and effects of global change in both polar
regions, and into many other matters relevant to the poles. A history of the IPYs
(First IPY 1882–83, Second IPY1932–33, and Third IPY, which was called the
International Geophysical Year 1957–58), is available at http://www.ipy.org (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010). A representative sampling of IPY projects can be found by
searching the IPY Publications Database (IPYPD), available at
http://www.nisc.com/ipy (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
140. See Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks Homepage, http://www.arctic
observing.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
141. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. BURKE, MARINE SCIENCE RESEARCH AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 8, at 9. Stated simplistically, the
UNCLOS regime for marine scientific research requires a coastal State’s
permission for scientific activities in its territorial sea and, subject to fewer
restrictions, in its EEZ and on its continental shelf.
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USSR took the initiative and proposed that the IOC seek, inter alia,
to elaborate a general convention embodying principles for
safeguarding marine science research.”142 Such a convention never
materialized but that initiative by the USSR represents well not only
its leadership, but also the international scientific community’s
engagement in the process that eventually led to Part XIII on Marine
Scientific Research being included in the 1982 Convention. Eighty
years earlier, in 1902, Russia was a founding member of the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, which in 1964
produced the first international agreement regarding marine scientific
research.143
Recalling these actions by predecessor entities to the Russian
Federation is a timely reminder of the potential it has today to take a
leading role in promoting broad access for scientific research
throughout the Arctic. The importance of the circumpolar North to
all Arctic states provides incentives to enter into more collaborative
scientific undertakings in the Arctic Ocean. As the Article 76 process
is proving, developments in the world of science may well open
doors for countries to work together on the political level as well.

142. Id. at 9.
143. See WEGELEIN, supra note 137, at 24 & nn. 54-55 (noting that Convention
for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Sept. 12, 1964, 652
U.N.T.S. 237, established the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(“ICES”) in 1902). ICES was originally founded by Russia, Great Britain, the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Id.

BAKER_TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

280

2/15/2010 2:10 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:251

APPENDIX
FIGURE ONE144

144. Martin Jakobsson, et al., An improved bathymetric portrayal of the Arctic
Ocean: Implications for ocean modeling and geological, geophysical and
oceanographic analyses, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS, L07602, 2008.
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FIGURE TWO145

145. Ron Macnab & Richard Haworth, Earth Science and the Law of the
Sea:Keys to Canada’s Offshore Energy and Mineral Resources Beyond 200
Nautical Miles, 28 GEOSCIENCE CAN. 79, 80 fig.1 (2001).

